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Pain Mismanagement:
The Opioid Problem in the NFL
Dylan McGowan*
In 2014 and 2015, two groups of former National Football
League (“NFL”) players brought lawsuits against the NFL for its
handling and distribution of opioids and other dangerous painkillers. While neither lawsuit has succeeded in its goal of addressing the painkiller problem, they brought to light the broken pain
management culture of the NFL and the health risks these medications pose to both active and former players. Addressing the opioid
problem should be a top priority for the NFL and the National
Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”). This Note examines the pain management crisis in the NFL, and analyzes the
two player lawsuits, illustrating the difficulty players face in obtaining relief in the courts. Additionally, this Note discusses the
joint NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and
demonstrates the NFLPA’s need to negotiate for changes in that
agreement to secure relief for former players and protect active
players from any further harm.
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INTRODUCTION

Hall of Famer Richard Dent played fifteen seasons in the
National Football League (“NFL”) from 1983 to 1997.1 During his
time with the Bears, he was named a First-Team All-Pro2 and Most
Valuable Player of Super Bowl XX; 3 he was additionally named to
the Pro-Bowl four times4 and, in 1985, led the NFL in sacks.5
Unbeknownst to most, Dent had such success in part due to a
steady supply of painkillers to keep him performing for his team. 6
The emphasis on painkiller use in the NFL to ensure on-field
production was made clear to Dent early in his career. 7 During a
preseason practice prior to his 1983 rookie season, Dent tore his
hamstring, as well as tendons and ligaments in his ankle.8 Barely
able to walk, he received anti-inflammatories and painkillers, and

1

Sheilla Dingus, Are Prescription Painkillers an NFL Sanctioned PED?, ADVOC. FOR
FAIRNESS IN SPORTS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://advocacyforfairnessinsports.org/currentlitigation/nfl-painkiller-lawsuits/are-prescription-painkillers-an-nfl-sanctioned-ped/;
[https://perma.cc/6WLE-LUCG]; Richard Dent, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE,
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/D/DentRi00.htm [https://perma.cc/5D7PYYYS].
2
All-Pro, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 14, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Pro
[https://perma.cc/5S9K-49AQ]. All-Pro is a distinction awarded to the best players at each
position during a given season. Id.
3
Super Bowl Most Valuable Player Award, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Super_Bowl_Most_Valuable_Player_Award [https://perma.cc/3G4Z-R6RT]. The
Most Valuable Player award is given to the player voted to have had an important impact
in the Super Bowl. It is often given to the player deemed to have performed the best during
the game. Id.
4
See generally Tom Sheen, What is the Pro Bowl? Everything You Need to Know About
NFL Version of All-Star Game, THE SUN (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/
sport/5377761/what-is-the-pro-bowl-nfl-all-star-game/ [https://perma.cc/H5FV-KEJM].
5
See generally Sack, SPORTS LINGO, https://www.sportslingo.com/sportsglossary/s/sack/ [https://perma.cc/GP49-2EMY]; NFL Sacks Year-by-Year Leaders (Since
1982),
PRO
FOOTBALL
REFERENCE,
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/
leaders/sacks_year_by_year.htm. [https://perma.cc/ZH3T-8YWZ]. A sack is awarded
when a player tackles the quarterback behind the line of scrimmage before he has thrown
a pass. Id.
6
Dingus, supra note 1.
7
Id.; see also Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Demand for Jury Trial Class
Action at 1, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. C-14-2324) [hereinafter Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint].
8
Dingus, supra note 1; Dent Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7,
at 28.
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subsequently returned to the field.9 He recalls playing the last preseason game of that year on so many drugs that he could barely
remember playing at all.10 This was Dent’s first encounter with
NFL’s pain management culture—one that encouraged the use of
pills and painkillers to keep players performing for their teams. 11
Throughout Dent’s career, team doctors and trainers continued
to provide him with pain medication so he would return to the field
despite severe injuries.12 For instance during a game in Seattle in
1990, Dent suffered a broken bone in his foot. 13 Team doctors told
him that he would require surgery, but no further damage could be
done if he continued playing on the injury. 14 Trusting his doctors, he
followed their advice and played the final eight weeks of the season
aided by a steady diet of pills and repeated injections of painkillers. 15
Dent now has permanent nerve damage in the foot.16 Dent additionally suffers from an enlarged heart, which he claims is due to the
large quantities of opioid pain medication team physicians and trainers gave him during his NFL career. 17
Dent’s experience with opioids and painkillers in the NFL is not
unique. Many other players whose careers span many decades
have shared similar stories.18 These experiences form the basis of
two player lawsuits, Dent v. National Football League in which
Richard Dent was the lead plaintiff, and Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals,
LLC, et al.19 Despite these harrowing tales, the NFL has not done
enough to address the concerns raised over its culture of opioid and
painkiller abuse.

9

Dingus, supra note 1.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Dingus, supra note 1.
18
See generally Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 4-7;
Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals,
LLC, 2016 WL 3566945 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-01030).
19
See Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7; Plaintiffs’ Class
Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18.
10
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In March 2020, the NFL and the NFL Players Association
(“NFLPA”) entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”).20 A CBA is a labor agreement that often addresses a
variety of subjects, including working conditions, benefits, and salaries, among others.21 This new CBA included provisions meant to
tackle the pain management problem in the NFL. While the new
provisions are a step in the right direction, they are inadequate to
fully address the problem.22 For instance, conflicts of interest in
player medical care remain a significant concern. Team physicians’
financial interest to get players back on the field for their employers
is often at odds with actions that would enhance players’ health.23
Similarly, a lack of alternatives, such as medical marijuana, ensure
that players have no choice but to turn to powerful opioids and other
painkillers to manage their pain.24 Finally, the retirement benefits
available to players are limited and often run out or are difficult to
obtain when players need them most.25
This Note argues that the NFL and NFLPA must make further
substantive changes to the NFL CBA and Substance Abuse Policy
to remedy the dangerous pain management culture the league has
fostered. Part I outlines the opioid crisis in America generally and
the NFL specifically. It also provides foundational background
information on the two player painkiller lawsuits and the NFL CBA.
Part II discusses the lawsuits and CBA in depth, explaining the difficulty players face in succeeding in court and the shortcomings of
the new 2020 CBA. Part III offers solutions to address the opioid
problem in the NFL, stressing the need to reform medical care,
treatment options, and retired player benefits. Part III recommends
policies that limit conflicts of interest in medical care, such as
increasing team physician independence of medical treatment and
widening access to and enhancing the duration of retirement benefits
for former players.
20

See generally NFLPA Approves New 10-Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, N.Y.
POST (Mar. 15, 2020) https://nypost.com/2020/03/15/nflpa-approves-new-10-yearcollective-bargaining-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/9Z8X-KK5P].
21
See infra Section I.C.
22
See infra Section II.C.
23
See infra Section II.C.1.
24
See infra Section II.C.2.
25
See infra Section II.C.3.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Opioid Crisis in the United States
For the past two decades, America has been in the throes of an
opioid epidemic and more broadly a pain management crisis. 26
Opioids are natural, synthetic, or semi-synthetic chemicals that
interact with opioid receptors in the body to reduce the sensation of
pain.27 Beginning in the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies
began aggressively pushing doctors to prescribe their patients
opioid pain relievers.28 The manufacturers spent millions in
exaggerating the benefits of their opioid painkillers while simultaneously downplaying their risks for treatment of chronic pain 29
despite contrary evidence.30 The manufacturers created websites and
distributed educational materials which claimed that people who
take opioids rarely become addicted.31 For example, Purdue Pharma
sponsored a publication, disseminated by the American Pain Foundation, that stated the risk of addiction in children is less than one
percent.32 Many doctors, convinced of the pills’ efficacy and hoping
to help their patients, began prescribing opioid painkillers
in enormous quantities.33 Other less scrupulous doctors saw opportunity and established pill mills, practices where they see many

26

Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L. INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020)
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/
2ZFA-6DQR].
27
Commonly Used Terms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/terms.html [https://perma.cc/XL2S-LMSH].
28
German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic, Explained, VOX (Dec. 21, 2017, 9:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/3/16079772/opioid-epidemic-drugoverdoses [https://perma.cc/K6NL-MESU] [hereinafter Opioid Epidemic, Explained].
29
German Lopez, The Thousands of Lawsuits Against Opioid Companies, Explained,
VOX (Oct. 17, 2019, 6:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/7/
15724054/opioid-epidemic-lawsuits-purdue-oxycontin
[https://perma.cc/PA97-5PEW]
[hereinafter Thousands of Lawsuits].
30
Lopez, Opioid Epidemic, Explained, supra note 28.
31
Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29.
32
Id.
33
German Lopez, America’s Huge Problem with Opioid Prescribing, in One Quote,
VOX, (Sept. 18, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/9/18/
16326816/opioid-epidemic-keith-humphreys [https://perma.cc/X8UE-5DFX].
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more patients and issue many more painkiller prescriptions than is
typical, to make a profit.34
At the same time, distributors continued supplying pills even
when it should have been clear that the drugs were being
misused.35 For instance, millions of pills flooded into communities
with only a few hundred residents. 36 In some states, pharmacies
filled more painkiller prescriptions than there were total people in
the state.37 In 2012, doctors wrote 259 million opioid prescripttions, enough to provide a bottle of medication to every adult in
the country.38 In allowing this volume of drugs to flow to these
communities, drug distributors flouted their responsibilities to
prevent abuse. Federal regulations require distributors to monitor
supply chains for suspicious orders to ensure that drugs are not being
abused.39 Unsurprisingly, in part due to this failure to monitor
suspicious purchases, America became the biggest consumer of
opioids in the world by a wide margin. 40
The results of this massive overconsumption of these dangerous
narcotics were tragic. Between 1999 and 2015, more than 560,000
Americans died from opioid overdoses41—many thousands involving the same pills that manufacturers earlier said were safe and
nonaddictive.42 This enormous death toll led many states and localities to take legal action, filing thousands of lawsuits against manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies for their role in the

34

Id.
Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29.
36
Id.
37
German Lopez, How the Opioid Epidemic Became America’s Worst Drug
Crisis Ever, in 15 Maps and Charts, VOX, (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:51 PM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/3/23/14987892/opioid-heroin-epidemiccharts [https://perma.cc/T4AN-JXES] [hereinafter America’s Worst Drug Crisis].
38
Kim Painter, Painkiller Prescription Rates Vary Widely Among States, USA TODAY
(July 1, 2014, 3:49 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/01/pain
killer-prescription-rates-states/11898327/ [https://perma.cc/YV4W-UT7Z].
39
See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b).
40
Lopez, America’s Worst Drug Crisis, supra note 37.
41
Id.
42
Id.; see also Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
[https://perma.cc/VT5H-UKQN]. According to Figure 4, many of the deaths that were
attributable to opioid overdoses were caused by prescription opioids. Id.
35
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crisis.43 Not wanting to face the cost and publicity of trial, many of
the companies have attempted to reach settlements of tens of
billions of dollars.44 For Purdue—the company many believe
sparked the opioid crisis with its OxyContin pill—it has led to
an $8.3 billion settlement, an agreement to plead guilty to three
felonies, and bankruptcy.45 Some of the hardest hit states and localities disapprove of such settlements saying they fail to hold those
responsible for the crisis accountable, indicating that opioid related
litigation is far from over.46
Even those individuals who have not followed the opioid saga
in the news are likely cognizant of it due to its frequent presence in
popular culture. The opioid crisis has been the subject of at least two
episodes of the HBO show Last Week Tonight with John Oliver47

43

Lopez, Thousands of Lawsuits, supra note 29.
Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, Mallinckrodt Reaches $1.6 Billion Deal
to Settle Opioid Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/25/health/mallinckrodt-opioid-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/V9Z6-Y5RM];
Laura Strickler, Purdue Pharma Offers $10-12 Billion to Settle Opioid Claims, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/purdue-pharma-offers-10-12billion-settle-opioid-claims-n1046526 [https://perma.cc/4FR2-BJQ8].
45
Jan Hoffman & Katie Benner, Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for
Opioid Sales, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
10/21/health/purdue-opioids-criminal-charges.html
[https://perma.cc/8T9Q-UGV7];
Andrew Joseph, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin and Other Drugs, Files for
Bankruptcy, STAT (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/16/purduepharma-maker-of-oxycontin-and-other-drugs-files-for-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/PXA4-PH58]; Associated Press & Laura Strickler, Purdue Pharma,
Maker of Painkiller OxyContin, Files for Bankruptcy as Part of Settlement, NBC NEWS
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/purdue-pharma-makerpainkiller-oxycontin-files-bankruptcy-part-settlement-n1054711 [https://perma.cc/745EQWSA].
46
Jan Hoffman, Opioid Settlement Offer Provokes Clash Between States and Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/health/opioidssettlement.html [https://perma.cc/B7P6-B533]; Meryl Kornfield, Christoper Rowland,
Lenny Bernstein & Devlin Barrett, Purdue Pharma agrees to plead guilty to federal
criminal charges in settlement over opioid crisis, WASH POST (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/10/21/purdue-pharma-charges/
[https://perma.cc/8H4Z-73HH].
47
Opioids, LAST WEEK TONIGHT WITH JOHN OLIVER (HBO), YOUTUBE (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pdPrQFjo2o
[https://perma.cc/H9TC-2597];
Opioids II, LAST WEEK TONIGHT WITH JOHN OLIVER (HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qCKR6wy94U [https://perma.cc/HYE4-3KEB].
44
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and was covered by Hasan Minhaj on his Netflix show Patriot Act.48
These shows helped raise public consciousness of the issue, which
helps ensure greater understanding of this problem. 49 Despite this
increased cultural awareness, many people are likely not mindful of the impact opioids and other painkillers have had on a popular form of entertainment itself, one many people enjoy each week:
NFL football.50
B. Opioids in the National Football League
Each Sunday51 millions of Americans tune in to watch their
favorite athletes and teams play one of the most popular and
profitable games on earth.52 However, those viewers may not know
that to stay on the field players, like Richard Dent, have resorted to using powerful opioids and other painkillers to play through

48

Victoria Kim, Hasan Minhaj: Drug Companies, This Crisis is on You, FIX (Aug. 13,
2019), https://www.thefix.com/hasan-minhaj-drug-companies-crisis
[https://perma.cc/5J9T-RMVU]. Netflix is also home to a four-part documentary series
called The Pharmacist which mixed a story about one man’s fight against the opioid crisis
with another of America’s addictions, true crime. Sophie Gilbert, The Story
The Pharmacist Can’t Tell, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
culture/archive/2020/02/netflix-the-pharmacist-true-crime-opioid-epidemic/606604/
[https://perma.cc/3XHA-MLBQ]. Another eight-part Netflix series, Painkiller, about the
origins of the opioid crisis, has been ordered by the streaming giant as well. Joe Otterson,
Netflix Sets Opioid Crisis Series From “Narcos” Eric Newman, Peter Berg to Direct,
VARIETY (Feb. 18, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/netflix-opioid-crisis-seriespeter-berg-eric-newman-micah-fitzerman-blue-noah-harpster-1203506588/
[https://perma.cc/7QX8-7UYK].
49
Andrew Joseph, From Rural Kentucky to HBO, STAT (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/16/john-oliver-sackler-deposition-purdue-pharma/
[https://perma.cc/9Q7D-8CWW].
50
See
generally
National
Football
League,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Football-League
[https://perma.cc/2TTA4CJ9].
51
Monday and Thursday too.
52
Jon Lafayette, NFL Games Score Big With 5% Boost in Viewership, BROADCASTING
+ CABLE (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/nfl-games-score-bigwith-5-in-viewership [https://perma.cc/B526-XD7K]; Sourav Das, Top 10 Most Popular
Sports in the World, SPORTS SHOWS, https://sportsshow.net/top-10-most-popular-sports-inthe-world/ [https://perma.cc/EXG2-922E]; Michael Colangelo, The NFL made roughly
$16 billion in revenue last year, TOUCHDOWN WIRE (July 15, 2019),
https://touchdownwire.usatoday.com/2019/07/15/nfl-revenue-owners-players-billions/
[https://perma.cc/T7RP-GQHM].
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injuries.53 While extremely effective for treating short-term pain,
these drugs are addictive and dangerous if not used properly.54
The reliance on painkillers allows players to perform for the fans
and their team but comes at great cost to their long-term health. 55
Former players noted how easy it was to get painkillers, saying they
were handed out like “tic tacs”56 or “candy.”57 Similarly, Eugene
Monroe, a former NFL offensive tackle for the Jacksonville Jaguars
and Baltimore Ravens, described players waiting in line outside the
trainer’s office to get their pregame shot of Toradol, a nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”). 58 Players euphemistically
called it riding the “T-train.”59 While not an opioid, Toradol is a
powerful painkiller that can have serious side effects when not used
properly.60 Alongside opioids, Toradol has become a drug of choice
in the NFL.61 Nevertheless few, if any, players were warned of the
side effects of these easily available drugs. 62
53

Eugene Monroe, Getting Off the T Train, PLAYERS’ TRIB. (May 23, 2016),
https://www.theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/2016-5-23-eugene-monroe-ravensmarijuana-opioids-toradol-nfl [https://perma.cc/58NL-ACM8].
54
Opioids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugtopics/opioids [https://perma.cc/V7YP-X2HD].
55
Sara Bellum, Painkiller Abuse in the NFL, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE
(Sept. 10, 2013), https://teens.drugabuse.gov/blog/post/painkiller-abuse-nfl-hefty-priceentertainment [https://perma.cc/8MYZ-UCSJ].
56
Sally Jenkins & Rick Maese, Pain and Pain Management in NFL Spawn a Culture of
Prescription Drug Use and Abuse, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/pain-and-pain-management-in-nflspawn-a-culture-of-prescription-drug-use-and-abuse/2013/04/13/3b36f4de-a1e9-11e2bd52-614156372695_story.html [https://perma.cc/E6CB-VB3V].
57
Des Bieler, Calvin Johnson Says Painkillers Were Handed Out ‘Like Candy’ to NFL
Players, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2016/07/06/calvin-johnson-says-painkillers-were-handed-out-like-candy-to-nflplayers/ [https://perma.cc/4VJN-AX5T].
58
Monroe, supra note 53.
59
Id.
60
See generally Toradol Solution, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug6418/toradol-injection/details [https://perma.cc/X52L-342L]; Toradol, RX LIST,
https://www.rxlist.com/toradol-side-effects-drug-center.htm
[https://perma.cc/HV5LRQK9]; Jordan Zirm, How Dangerous is Toradol, the NFL Pain Fix Known as ‘Vitamin
T’?, STACK (Jan. 22. 2016), https://www.stack.com/a/how-dangerous-is-toradol-the-nflpain-fix-known-as-vitamin-t [https://perma.cc/M6CP-N96B].
61
Nicoleas R. Mayne, Derailing the T Train: Curbing the Abuse of Toradol in the
National Football League, 25 SPORTS L.J. 167, 168 (2018).
62
Jenkins & Maese, supra note 56.
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A 2011 survey of retired NFL players found that over fifty-two
percent of respondents had used opioids and other painkillers
during their careers.63 Seventy-one percent of those who reported
opioid use during their playing days also stated misusing them.64
The overall rate of misuse was thirty-seven percent, which is
nearly three times higher than the lifetime rate of nonmedical use
of opioids among the general population of a comparable age. 65
These numbers are shocking, but understandable due to the high
rate of injury among NFL players. Fifty-six percent of the players who reported opioid use suffered three or more injuries during
their careers.66 Sixty-one percent reported a career-ending injury.67
The high risk of suffering an injury in the NFL, and near inevitability that players will need medication to manage their pain, emphasizes the importance of addressing the opioid problem in the NFL.
The players’ misuse of opioids does not stop once their careers
end. Former athletes who misused opioids during their playing
careers were roughly three times more likely to have misused in the
past thirty days than players who used just as prescribed. 68 Similarly,
seven percent of players reported misusing opioids in the last thirty
days, three times higher than among men of a similar age in the general population.69 This rate of misuse can likely be traced to lingering effects from their playing careers. As a result, only thirteen percent of former players surveyed reported current excellent health. 70
Meanwhile, ninety-three percent of the sample reported living with
pain.71 Eighty-one percent perceived their pain to be moderate or
severe, which is over three times higher than the rate of pain reported
63

Linda B. Cottler et al., Injury, Pain, and Prescription Opioid Use Among Former
National Football League (NFL) Players, 116 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 188, 190
(2011).
64
Id. Players who reported that they used more pills or used pills for more days than
prescribed; misled a physician to get opioids; used someone else’s prescription, or received
opioids from a teammate, coach, trainer, the “pill guy,” a family member or friend, a dealer
or the Internet, during their NFL careers, were categorized as NFL misusers.
65
Id. at 192.
66
Id. at 190.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 191.
69
Id. at 192.
70
Id. at 191.
71
Id.
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in the general population.72 Of additional concern, players who
misused opioids also tended to drink more than players who did not,
greatly increasing the risk of death. 73
C. The Collective Bargaining Agreement and Substance Abuse
Policy
An important instrument that will have a significant role in
resolving legal disputes surrounding opioid misuse in the NFL is the
CBA. A CBA is a contract between management and workers that
covers a variety of subjects, including working conditions, benefits,
and salaries.74 In 1968, the NFLPA and the NFL negotiated and
entered into a collective bargaining agreement for the first time.75
The NFLPA and the NFL Management Council (“NFLMC”), the
NFL’s sole and exclusive bargaining representative, have negotiated
and entered into successive collective bargaining agreements periodically in the ensuing years. 76 On March 15, 2020, after nearly
ten months of negotiations, the players approved a new CBA by a
narrow vote of 1,019 to 959.77 This new agreement, which contains
new provisions relevant to the opioid issue, will bind the two sides
through the 2030 season.78
1. Player Medical Care in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement
The 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining agreement—and earlier
agreements—at issue in the Dent and Evans player lawsuits
72

Id. at 191–92. The rate reported in the general population is 26%. Id.
Id. at 191; More than Half of People Who Misuse Prescription Opioids Also Binge
Drink, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2019/p0611-people-opioids-drink.html
[https://perma.cc/G6PY-RP5D]
(last updated June 10, 2019).
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Michael B. Scallan, Painkillers for Profit Gains: How the Ninth Circuit’s Revival of
Dent v. NFL Could Hold the League Liable for Long-Term Injuries Caused by Its
Administration of Painkillers, 46 S.U. L. REV. 325, 327 (2019).
75
Nairi Dulgarian, How the Holding in Dent v. National Football League Tackles
Collective Bargaining, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 205, 218 (2019).
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Scallan, supra note 74, at 327.
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2020), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/28906786/nfl-players-approve-new-cba-2030
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sparsely addresses player medical care.79 Article thirty-nine of the
2011 CBA contains just seven sections devoted to medical care,
covering a scant three pages of the 301-page document. Section one
addresses team physicians and medical consultants.80 These doctors
are all hired and employed by the individuals teams, not the league.81
In addressing the doctor/patient relationship, the agreement states,
“each Club physician’s primary duty in providing player medical
care shall be not to the Club but instead to the player-patient.” 82
Section two lists criteria for team athletic trainers, who are again
employed directly by the team.83 Section three established an
“Accountability and Care Committee.”84 This committee is tasked
with “conduct[ing] research into prevention and treatment of illness
and injury commonly experienced by professional athletes, including patient care outcomes from different treatment methods.” 85
Sections four and five secure the players’ right to seek a second
opinion and hire the surgeon of their choice, respectively. 86 Section
six states that all players must undergo a pre-season physical examination administered by team physicians. 87 Section seven incorporates the leagues’ Policy and Program on Substances of Abuse and
the Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances. 88 The 2011
CBA makes no mention of opioids at all.
The 2020 CBA includes a significantly expanded article thirtynine, covering twenty-one sections and spanning twenty-seven
pages of the document.89 It contains many provisions discussing
79

For discussions of the lawsuits see infra Section I.A; NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION,
NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 171–74 (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-20112020.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFG6-8THX] [hereinafter NFL CBA 2011].
80
Id. at 171–72.
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Id.
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Id. at 172.
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Id. at 172–73.
85
Id. at 172.
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Id. at 173.
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Id.
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Id. at 173–74.
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NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT 214–41 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/
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topics covered by the 2011 agreement, including team physicians
and athletic trainers as well as players’ right to a second opinion and
the surgeon of their choice.90 Many of the new provisions of article
thirty-nine are aimed at player safety, including provisions covering
field surface safety,91 equipment safety,92 head, neck, and spine
safety, concussion diagnosis and management, 93 and a new behavioral health program.94
The new Prescription Medication and Pain Management
Program found in section twenty is particularly significant. 95 This
provision establishes a Joint Pain Management Committee to “provide guidance and establish uniform standards addressing club practices and policies regarding pain management and use of
prescription medication by NFL players, including the administration of certain federally scheduled drugs.”96 The purpose of the
committee is to create guidelines for the teams’ medical staff when
administering pain medication.97 These guidelines reflect the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) mandate that players receive the
FDA drug warning for each prescription provided to them and
understand the potential side effects.98 The committee is also tasked
with implementing player education about the use and risks of
pain medications—particularly opioids—and tracking all prescriptions issued by NFL team physicians.99 Each team is also required
to hire a pain management specialist, which is a physician with specialization in one of six areas of medicine specified in the agreement.100 Section twenty also lays out a detailed enforcement procedure for alleged violation of the Pain Management Guidelines

Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AM68-RWET] [hereinafter NFL CBA 2020].
90
Id. at 214, 215–16, 220.
91
Id. at 221–22.
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Id. at 222–23.
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Id. at 225–29.
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established by the Joint Pain Committee.101 These improvements
address some concerns about opioids while failing to address other
factors that lead to the opioid crisis in the NFL.
2. The Substance Abuse Policy and Medical Marijuana
Both the 2011 and 2020 CBAs incorporate the league’s Policy
and Program on Substance Abuse into the agreements.102 The 2020
Substance Abuse Policy prohibits the illegal use of drugs, the abuse
of prescription and over-the-counter drugs, and the abuse of alcohol;
the policy identifies these three kinds of drugs as potential
“substances of abuse.”103 The policy states that its primary goal
is to assist players who misuse substances of abuse.104 It also sets
out procedures and protocols for testing 105 and entry into the
programs,106 as well as discipline for violations of the policy.107
Marijuana is among the substances banned by the NFL under the
policy.108 Although the 2020 CBA still bans marijuana, the league
did make some concessions.109 First, the league raised the threshold
necessary to trigger a positive test from thirty-five nanograms to 150
nanograms.110 Second, the pre-season testing window was reduced
from four months to two weeks of training camp.111 Third, players
101
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Id. at 221; NFL CBA 2011, supra note 79, at 173–74.
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will also no longer face suspensions for violations of the program
for marijuana, but will still face fines. 112 While these changes make
it much harder to be caught using marijuana, the substance nevertheless remains banned.113 Many players and doctors advocate for
the league to allow medical marijuana 114 as an alternative to opioids
and other painkillers.115 The NFL’s policy is problematic because
studies have shown that use of medical marijuana can reduce use of
opioids in patients with chronic pain.116
Medical marijuana is unavailable even for those seeking a therapeutic use exemption117 (“TUE”), which is where a player requests
pluses-but-benefits-for-marijuana-users-are-far-down-the-list-224020429.html
[https://perma.cc/N8HJ-3EUN].
112
Mike Florio, New CBA Removes All Substance-Abuse Suspensions for Positive Drug
Tests, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 5, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2020/03/05/new-cba-removes-all-substance-abuse-suspensions-for-positive-drug-tests/
[https://perma.cc/37E3-D595].
113
See NFL CBA 2020, supra note 89, at 238.
114
Marijuana as Medicine, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/drugfacts/marijuana-medicine [https://perma.cc/F5CT-FMEB].
115
SI Staff, Ricky Williams Takes the High Road, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(July 18, 2016), https://vault.si.com/vault/2016/07/18/ricky-williams-takes-high-road
[https://perma.cc/D6WJ-PRD2]; Tyler Conway, DeAndre Hopkins on NFL Allowing CBD
Medication: ‘I Only Think It Would Help’, BLEACHER REP. (July 2, 2018),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2784108-deandre-hopkins-on-nfl-allowing-cbdmedication-i-only-think-it-would-help [https://perma.cc/NZ7C-WHFV]; Mike Freeman,
Banned, but Bountiful: Marijuana Coveted by NFL Players as Invaluable Painkiller,
BLEACHER REP. (June 30, 2015), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2486218-banned-butbountiful-marijuana-coveted-by-nfl-players-as-invaluable-painkiller
[https://perma.cc/YF9D-C2JD]; Rick Maese, NFL Players Fight Pain with Medical
Marijuana: ‘Managing it with pills was slowly killing me’, WASH. POST (May 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/nfl-players-fight-pain-with-medicalmarijuana-managing-it-with-pills-was-slowly-killing-me/2017/05/02/676e4e62-2e8011e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html [https://perma.cc/NY2Q-QRAS]; Adam Kilgore,
Ravens Lineman Pushing Marijuana on the NFL, WASH. POST (June 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/ravens-lineman-pushing-marijuana-onthe-nfl/2016/06/05/b600dda4-28fc-11e6-ae4a-3cdd5fe74204_story.html
[https://perma.cc/F35C-VJJR].
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Risk for Some with Chronic Pain, MICH. NEWS (Mar. 22, 2016), https://news.umich.edu/
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permission from the league to use an otherwise prohibited substance
for medical purposes.118 Often players seek and are granted TUEs
for substances that are banned under another league substance program, the Policy on Performance-Enhancing Substances, to treat a
diagnosed medical problem.119 Although opioids and other painkillers are subject to the substance abuse program if used illegally, they
do not require a TUE when they are prescribed by a physician and
used accordingly.120 How-ever, marijuana, even with a prescription,
is not permitted without a TUE, as shown by the case of the Buffalo
Bills’ Seantrel Henderson who was suspended for using doctor
prescribed medical marijuana to treat his Crohn’s disease. 121 While
players can seek a TUE for medical marijuana under the Substance
Abuse Policy, they face hurdles in having it approved.
These exemptions may be granted when four conditions are
met.122 First, the medication must be necessary for the treatment of
the medical problem for which the exemption was requested. 123
Second, acceptable alternative treatments with substances that are
not banned must have been attempted and failed, or reasons for not
mike-james-request-to-take-marijuana-as-a-painkiller-denied-by-nfl
[https://perma.cc/V2CD-YXPN].
118
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119
Players have been granted TUEs for substances such as Adderall. Mark Ziegler &
Hieu Tran Phan, Behind the Shield: NFL Drug Testing Policy Not As Good as Sold, SAN
DIEGO TRIB. (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/nfl/sdut-nfldrug-testing-policies-2014dec08-story.html [https://perma.cc/4798-AWCM]. Adderall is
banned under the Policy on Performance-Enhancing Substances. The conditions for a TUE
under that policy are the same as under the Substance Abuse Policy. NAT’L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE POL’Y ON PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING SUBSTANCES Appendix I (2018),
https://nflcommunications.com/Documents/2018%20Policies/2018%20Policy%20on%20
Performance-Enhancing%20Substances%20-%20EXTERNAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FRY4-4Q8Y]; NFL SUBSTANCE ABUSE POL’Y, supra note 103, at
Appendix F.
120
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[https://perma.cc/
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using the alternatives must be presented. 124 Third, the player must
have undergone an appropriate evaluation and submitted medical
records documenting the diagnosis for review. 125 Fourth, the player
may not begin using the substances until the TUE has been
granted.126 Because opioids and other painkillers are available for
use by players when they have a valid prescription without a TUE
and the NFL is generally skeptical of the benefits of medical marijuana, players fail at condition two. 127 As a result, medical marijuana
is not in practice available to players despite its medical benefits.
The policy states that the substance abuse “can lead to onthe-field injuries . . . and to personal hardship.” 128 It also notes that
substance abuse has tragically led to the death of several NFL players.129 However, disallowing alternatives such as medical marijuana
under the substance abuse policy may drive players to dangerous
painkillers and opioids to manage their pain, increasing the risk of
both injury and death.
3. Retired Player Benefits
The NFL offers its players a group insurance plan under both the
2011 and 2020 CBAs.130 Retired players are able to remain on the
plan for five years after retirement, but only if they have met the
vesting requirement under the Retirement Plan. 131 Under the 2011
CBA, a player needed four credited seasons to meet this requirement.132 Under the new 2020 CBA, a player meets the requirement
if he has accrued three NFL seasons.133 Players who do not meet this
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vesting threshold are ineligible for post-retirement healthcare on
the NFL’s player plan.134
Article sixty of the 2020 CBA covers NFL Player Disability.135
The new 2020 agreement reduces disability benefits by about
twenty percent136 for some players who receive total and permanent
disability.137 The 2020 CBA has an added offset provision, which
deducts the amount players receive in social security benefits from
their total and permanent disability benefits.138 The players conceded to this cut in return for the lower vesting cutoff and pensions
for pre-1993 players who only had three credited seasons. 139 If a
player qualifies for and takes an NFL pension, the disability amount
is reduced by that value as well.140
D. Preemption under Labor Management Relations Act Section
301
The CBA is the players’ strongest tool to address the opioid and
medical care problem. They can negotiate for provisions to be
included in the legally binding agreement that call for stronger
protections and guarantees from the NFL that are necessary to
134

Sally Jenkins and Rick Maese, Do No Harm: Who Should Bear the Costs of
Retired NFL Players’ Medical Bills? WASH. POST (May 9, 2013),
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combat these issues. But the CBA also provides the NFL with one
of its best defenses in court. Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”) states, “suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees… may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties….”141 Courts have interpreted Section
301 to preempt state law claims that arise directly from a CBA
or are “substantially dependent” on the analysis and interpretation
of such an agreement.142 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,143 the
Supreme Court extended preemption under Section 301 to state tort
law claims.144
The test for Section 301 preemption is two-pronged.145 First,
a court must determine whether the claim involves “rights conferred upon an employee by virtue of state-law [and] not by a
CBA.”146 If the right asserted exists solely due to the CBA, the
claim is preempted.147 However, if the right exists independent
of the CBA, the court must then ask whether the claim is “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.”148 Courts must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the state law claim requires interpretation of a CBA to be
resolved.149 If the claim cannot be resolved without interpretation of
the CBA, then the claim is preempted.150 In the context of player
lawsuits, the claims must be analyzed in relation to the provisions
of the CBA or CBAs under which they played. 151
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II. DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING RELIEF FOR OPIOID RELATED HARMS

A. The NFL Opioid Litigation
Two lawsuits filed in the Northern District of California further
illustrate the extent of the opioid problem in the NFL. They also
highlight the challenge players face in attempting to affect
change through the court system because preemption challenges and
statutes of limitations provide significant hurdles to obtaining
relief. Additionally, the cases demonstrate the difficulty of avoiding
harm before it occurs under the current NFL medical care system.
Players face a pain management culture that encourages them
to return to play before it is safe, increasing the risk of further
injury and damage to their long-term health.
1. Dent v. National Football League
In 2014, a group of former players filed suit against the NFL for
its opioid practices. The players alleged that the league had
intentionally, recklessly, and negligently created and maintained a
culture of drug misuse, putting profit ahead of player health. 152 The
plaintiffs in the suit comprised individuals who played between
1969 and 2012.153 Although their individual careers spanned many
decades, the players had similar stories of playing through gruesome
injuries aided by powerful painkillers—with no warning of side
effects or their long term implications.154 The players’ complaint
alleged that the league distributed opioids, NSAIDs, and local
anesthetics—often without a prescription and without regard to individual players’ medical histories—in violation of federal drug
laws.155 As discussed above, lead plaintiff Richard Dent stated that
he was regularly given opioids, anesthetics, and anti-inflammatory
drugs to help him play through significant injuries. 156
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Players on other teams joined the class action lawsuit due to their
remarkably similar stories. Former offensive lineman Keith Van
Horne played an entire season on a broken leg with the help of pain
medication, albeit not purposefully.157 He claimed he only realized
his leg was broken five years later, having received pills to mask the
pain in the intervening years. 158 Similarly, in 2011 or 2012, Super
Bowl winning quarterback Jim McMahon first discovered that he
had suffered a broken neck at some point during his fifteen-year
career that ended in 1996.159 He believes he suffered the injury
during a 1993 playoff game; however, instead of holding him out of
the game, medical staff gave him medication and permitted him to
go back on the field.160 Moreover, no one from the NFL ever told
him of the injury.161 McMahon also claimed that during the course
of his career, team doctors and trainers gave him thousands of injections and copious amounts of pills without warning him about the
side effects.162 Another player, Marcellus Wiley, also said he
received hundreds, if not thousands, of injections and pills without
mention of side effects.163 In 2014, Wiley was hospitalized and
diagnosed with partial renal failure at only thirty-nine years old
and without a history of kidney problems.164 Kidney failure can be
a side effect of Toradol,165 a drug Wiley says he was given during
his playing days.166
In response to the lawsuit, the NFL brought two sets of motions
to dismiss: the first claimed that the players’ allegations were
preempted by Section 30, and the second asserted that the
statute of limitations had run.167 Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California granted the first set of motions to dismiss
157

Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 2.
Id.
159
Id. at 28.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 6.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Toradol, RXLIST, https://www.rxlist.com/toradol-drug.htm#description
[https://perma.cc/MMM2-BH9B] (last updated Aug. 1, 2018).
166
Dent Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 6.
167
Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C–14–02324, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1, (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018).
158

2020]

THE OPIOID PROBLEM IN THE NFL

245

on preemption grounds.168 Judge Alsup examined various provisions related to medical care in the numerous CBAs operative since
1982 and stated that although they didn’t specifically address
administration of painkillers, the court needed to interpret the provisions to determine the scope of the NFL’s duties in regards to the
players’ claims.169
The players appealed the district court decision to the Ninth
Circuit.170 Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Tallman found
that the players claims were not preempted under Section 301.171
The NFL’s duty to exercise reasonable care in the distribution of
medications did not arise out of the CBA,172 but rather out of the
various statutes governing controlled substances. 173 The panel held
similarly for the players’ negligent hiring and retention,174 negligent
misrepresentation,175 and fraud claims.176
With the benefit of discovery, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint in the district court.177 This complaint alleged that the
NFL had instituted a “return to play” business plan.178 They alleged
that the league prioritized profits over player safety, part of which
included encouraging players to return to the field as quickly as possible.179 The complaint stated that from the time they are rookies,
players are told, “you can’t make the Club in the tub,”180 referring
to players being unable to practice because they are in ice baths
168
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170
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recovering from injury. The complaint also stated that team doctors
and trainers knew they would be replaced if they allowed players
to rest and recover, rather than rushing them back onto the field
to bring the club revenue.181 As a result, the complaint alleged that
the NFL cultivated a culture that encouraged the administration of
dangerous opioid and painkillers to players in order to bring the
league maximum revenue.182
The complaint as amended also included medical records showing the frequency with which painkillers were administered to each
of the players.183 Often the records were incomplete, with dosages
missing.184 Documents and team professionals’ statements showed
that the teams and the league were aware of the mishandling of
painkillers.185 Bud Carpenter, a long-time Buffalo Bills trainer,
stated that he witnessed team doctors give players injections without identifying the medication or its side effects.186 One memorandum from the Atlanta Falcons said in part, “there is no evidence
that the doctor actually knows what medication has been given to
the players.”187 This lack of care allegedly continued even after the
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) investigated the clubs and is
indicative of the NFL’s laissez faire attitude toward opioids in its
pursuit of higher revenues.188
Unfortunately, the new information in the amended complaint
did not survive the NFL’s subsequent motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.189 Judge Alsup found that the players had
failed to plead what the Ninth Circuit said was needed of them:
that the NFL—not the individual clubs—had distributed controlled
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substances and prescription drugs.190 The court was not persuaded
that the “return to play” business plan was enough to transform the
actions of team doctors and trainers into the actions of the league.191
Additionally, Judge Alsup found that the plaintiffs failed to allege
that the NFL had provided direct medical care or treatment to
players that violated drug laws.192 In doing so, the court rejected the
argument that the NFL had voluntarily assumed any duty to ensure
that the clubs complied with the drug laws, 193 or that there was any
special relationship between the players and the league. 194
This second dismissal has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.195
The same three judge panel that decided the first appeal heard oral
argument on March 12, 2020.196 Even if the panel sides with the
players, ample time stands in the way of relief as a trial would still
need to be held.
2. Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals, LLC, et al.
In 2015, a second group of former players and family members of former players filed a second suit in the Northern District
of California.197 Learning from the Dent preemption dismissal, this
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time the plaintiffs named each individual team, rather than the NFL
itself, as defendants to avoid a preemption challenge.198 The claims
in this lawsuit were similar to those in Dent. The Evans plaintiffs
alleged intentional misrepresentation against the teams because the
athletes suffered injuries that the clubs exacerbated through administering medications to keep them on the field.199 The complaint
similarly contained numerous accounts of team medical personnel
providing players with opioids and other prescription painkillers,
without informing them of the name of the medication or warning
them of any side effects, so the players could continue to play. 200
The lead plaintiff, Etopia Evans, represented her late husband
Charles Evans’s estate.201 The plaintiffs claimed that the NFL
fostered a culture in which club employees—general managers,
coaches, doctors, trainers, and the players themselves—have a
financial interest in returning players to the field as soon as possible.202 Throughout Evans’s career, team doctors and trainers gave
him pills and injections to help him play through pain. 203 After his
football career, he became addicted to painkillers. 204 Charles Evans
died of an enlarged heart in 2008, eight years after retiring from
football and without a family history of heart issues. 205 Similarly,
former offensive lineman Jerry Wunsch recalled trainers walking up
and down the aisles on return flights from away games handing out
unmarked envelopes full of painkillers.206 Prior to a game in 2003,
Seahawks head coach Mike Holmgren asked Wunsch if he was able
to play through an injury.207 After Wunsch replied that he did not
think so, Coach Holmgren called Seahawks trainer Sam Ramsden
198

See id. at 2–8; see also Sheilla Dingus, Painkiller Abuse in the NFL Part III: A Tale
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and asked, “what can we do to help Mr. Wunsch play today?”208
Ramsden called team doctors, who gave Wunsch a Toradol shot
and 750 milligrams of Vicodin.209 When the medication began to
wear off at half time, he received an additional 750 milligrams of
Vicodin so he could play in the second half of the game. 210 The doctors administered these medications despite the fact that Wunsch
was already prescribed other anti-inflammatories.211 The “return to
play” policy led doctors and trainers to give players dangerous
quantities and combinations of drugs, placing the players’ health
second to profits.212
The clubs brought a motion to dismiss based on Section 301
preemption.213 Unlike in Dent, however, Judge Alsup here denied
the motion.214 He found that the Evans complaint differed in two
ways.215 First, the complaint was addressed to the individual clubs,
not the NFL.216 Second, the conduct alleged in the complaint was
intentional—rather than negligent—conduct.217 As a result, the
claims fell into the illegality exception to Section 301.218 The court
also rejected the club’s motion to dismiss as barred by the statute of
limitations on the limited record before it.219 The players later filed
an amended complaint, adding a civil RICO claim 220 as well as a
state law conspiracy claim.221 These claims aimed to address the
208
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“return to play” policy, in which teams conspired to give increasing
amounts of pain medication to players to keep them on the field
and increase profits.222
In response, the clubs moved to dismiss the amended complaint.223 This time the court sided with the clubs, finding that
the four-year statute of limitations had run on the RICO claim. 224
The court also dismissed the conspiracy claims, stating that no facts
in the amended complaint showed “any agreement or understanding
between the clubs to adhere to a return-to-play practice or
policy.”225 As to the intentional misrepresentation and concealment
claims, the court granted the motion to dismiss for all but eight
teams.226 The court found that claims had been adequately pled
against only those teams, but granted leave for the plaintiffs to
amend the complaint to better plead their claims against the
remaining teams.227
The players filed a second amended complaint on March 10,
2017 to better satisfy the court as to the claims against the other
clubs.228 The clubs again moved to dismiss.229 On May 15, 2019,
Judge Alsup granted the clubs’ motion to dismiss and summary
judgment motion for a majority of the claims.230 The court found
that the claims of intentional misrepresentation against only twelve
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of the thirty-two teams were adequately pled under Rule 9(b) 231 and
further that only the claims of Alphonso Carreker and Reggie
Walker survived summary judgment.232 The remaining players’
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 233
In an order dated July 21, 2017, Judge Alsup granted the
clubs’ motion for summary judgment on the intentional misrepresentation claims against the three remaining defendants. 234
The court found that the workers’ compensation statutes in California, Colorado, and Wisconsin—homes to the three remaining
defendant clubs—provided exclusive remedies for Carreker’s and
Walker’s claims.235 This was the final blow to the players’ case,
ending the Evans litigation.236
These lawsuits drew attention to the league’s drug administration practices. The Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) launched
a probe into claims that NFL players had been illegally given
painkillers to keep them on the field.237 The DEA also investigated
whether athletic trainers, who lack the proper medical license,
administered drugs.238 Agents interviewed team doctors and trainers
from multiple clubs as part of the investigation. 239 The NFL claimed
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that it was complying with the law, pointing to a 1994 letter from
the DEA that stated team doctors could administer drugs on road
trips.240 However, this ignored the fact that the DEA had warned the
NFL against this practice in 2011.241 In 2015, the league finally
changed its drug policy to require the use of local doctors to administer prescription medication to traveling teams,242 but mishandling
of painkillers persisted.243
The two player lawsuits demonstrate the extent and seriousness
of the pain management crisis in the NFL. Both complaints contain
harrowing stories detailing players’ struggles with pain both during
and after their playing careers. 244 The most significant cause of these
issues is the “return to play” culture that pervades the NFL and its
clubs.245 All actors in the NFL—owners, general managers, coaches,
and medical personnel—have financial incentives for players to
return to the field as soon as possible after injury, even if it jeopardizes their long term health. Players too are driven to risk their health
and return to the field early because if they are unable to perform,
they may be out of a job.246 The result of these strong financial
incentives is a culture that tolerates, if not encourages, the overuse
and abuse of opioids and other prescription painkillers among
players. While the former players in Dent and Evans sought to bring
attention to and obtain relief for the harm they suffered as a result
240
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of the “return to play” policy, the outcomes demonstrate that this
is a difficult task.
B. Inability to Remedy the “Return to Play” Culture in the Courts
Despite the variety of claims the players brought in their suits,
they have been unable to obtain relief in court. The player
complaints in both suits persuasively described the “return to play”
culture of the NFL, but neither prevailed.247 In Dent, the players
named the NFL itself as the defendant. 248 The court found that while
the league had an incentive to facilitate a “return to play” business
plan, the players had not shown that the NFL itself had distributed
drugs negligently or violated drug laws in pursuit of such a plan. 249
They failed to show that the NFL in some way directed or instructed
teams in their distribution of prescription painkillers. 250 In Evans,
the court dismissed the claims because it was unpersuaded that there
was an “agreement or understanding between the clubs to adhere
to a return-to-play practice or policy.”251
The outcome of these two cases shows the difficulty of
obtaining relief for the harmful effects of the “return to play”
culture in court. First, the naturally aligned financial incentives of
the NFL and its constituent clubs prevent players from demonstrating the meeting of the minds necessary to succeed on various
conspiracy claims. The players showed that the incentives of the
league, club management, and medical personnel are aligned in such
a way as to create an environment where they hurried players
back to the field by taking large quantities of prescription
painkillers. All involved stood to gain from the huge profits the NFL
generated when players were on the field and performing for
fans on game day, rather than sitting injured on the sidelines. The
difficulty lies in showing the presence of an agreement between
these parties to foster such a culture to succeed on claims in court. 252
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The players had the benefit of discovery in two separate suits but
were unable to show that the NFL directed teams to administer
excessive amounts of opioids or that the teams agreed among
themselves to do so.253 The players likely could not show either
an explicit agreement to adhere to a “return to play” policy between
the clubs or direct evidence that the NFL instructed the clubs to
administer opioids and other drugs in excessive quantities because
there was none.
Rather, each club’s individual economic incentives encouraged
it to administer excessive amounts of opioids, Toradol, and other
painkillers to players. As a result, team professionals kept players
on the field to continue accumulating revenue. Since all thirty-two
clubs have similar interests, there was no need to come to an
agreement to do something that would individually benefit them.
Additionally, because the clubs’ incentives were aligned with those
of the NFL, the latter had no need to direct teams as to how they
should administer painkillers to keep players on the field and for
revenue thriving. All involved likely decided to put player health
second to profits, whether consciously or not, because it was in their
economic interest to do so. Without evidence of an explicit agreement, claims in future lawsuits that require a meeting of the minds
are similarly likely to fail—again, leaving the players with no relief
for the harms they suffered.
Second, the statute of limitations represents a barrier for players to achieve recourse from the courts because many of their
ailments only manifest themselves years after retirement. Once
the players realize the extent of their injuries and the connection
to painkillers, the statute of limitations has oftentimes already
lapsed. As a result, they struggle to even have the opportunity
to present their claims against the league and clubs in court, as
occurred in Evans.254
Workers’ compensation is a third hurdle players face. A judge
may find that workers’ compensation, rather than the courts,
provides the proper remedy for players’ injuries, as Judge Alsup
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did in for Alphonso Carreker and Reggie Walker in Evans.255
Players may still face difficulty getting relief through workers’
compensation because of statutes of limitation for bringing claims
or maximum age cutoffs for claims by professional athletes.256
Moreover, the NFL has lobbied states to change their laws to make
it more difficult for players to bring workers’ compensation
claims.257 Such lobbying efforts resulted in a change to California’s
workers’ compensation statute.258 Previously, California was one of
the few states that allowed players to bring workers’ compensation
claims for cumulative trauma, as opposed to discrete single-event
injuries.259 This rule is even applied to those players who only played games in the states as members of a visiting team.260 The new
California law bars such claims, removing yet another avenue for
players to get relief. 261 The clubs (and their insurers) may also
challenge a workers’ compensation award in court, putting another
roadblock between players and a remedy.262 These obstacles demonstrate that the courts offer little opportunity for players to obtain
relief for harm they have already suffered.
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C. Shortcomings of the New CBA and Possible Preemption
Concerns
1. Inadequate Medical Care
As discussed above, the new 2020 CBA includes a significantly
expanded article thirty-nine which covers player medical care.
Among the additions is the new Prescription Medication and Pain
Management Program in section twenty, which establishes a Joint
Pain Management committee to set guidelines for club medical
personnel to follow when administering pain medication to players.
The committee is also tasked with tracking all prescriptions issued
by NFL team doctors. Section twenty also requires teams to provide
player education about prescription pain medication and hire a pain
management specialist.263
While the Joint Pain Committee and pain medication guidelines
are steps in the right direction, they fail to address the “return
to play” culture. Team management and physicians still have economic incentives to return players to the field as soon as possible.
The CBA states that the Joint Pain Committee guidelines must
reflect the FDA mandate that players receive warnings about provided prescription drugs.264 While this sounds like a significant improvement, this FDA requirement was already in place during the
period covered by the lawsuits.265 The NFL physicians still did not
follow the regulation.266 Providing players with education about prescription painkillers may allow them to make informed decisions,
but it does not remove the pressure to return to the field quickly.
Players may still turn to powerful, dangerous painkillers to keep
playing out of fear of losing their job or roster spot.
Section twenty does provide an enforcement procedure that can
punish clubs for failing to follow the Joint Pain Committee
guidelines and reporting requirements.267 This procedure again
facially appears like a win for the players, but a deeper look reveals
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that it is not. While any player, the NFLPA, or NFL management
council may trigger the procedure by filing a complaint, economic
incentives will likely prevent them from doing so. Players have very
little to gain from filing a complaint, but a lot to lose. They run the
risk of being ostracized by the league or labeled as a troublemaker,
putting future employment in jeopardy. The NFLPA will likely only
file a complaint at the request of a player, but for the same reasons
a player may fear his identity will be revealed. The NFL Management Council has even less of an incentive to file a complaint
because they work for the teams. Additionally, the discipline a club
would face is light, likely only a fine, which is paltry in comparison
to what they gain by putting players back on the field with the aid
of painkillers.
Finally, section twenty and article thirty-nine overall present
significant preemption concerns. Under Section 301 of the LMRA,
state law claims may be preempted if it is necessary to reference a
collective bargaining agreement to adjudicate the claims.268
Section 301 preemption has been used repeatedly to defend against
lawsuits269 brought by players, notably in the well-publicized
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) lawsuit that ultimately
led to the $765 million settlement in 2013.270 The increase in the size
of article thirty-nine in the 2020 CBA—from three and a
half in the 2011 CBA to twenty-seven pages in the 2020
agreement—and the addition of section twenty greatly expands the
universe of issues that will require interpretation of the CBA in
litigation. For instance, courts will need to analyze section twenty,
which did not exist at the time of the Dent or Evans lawsuits, to
determine the clubs’ responsibilities regarding prescription pain
medication. This will result in the preemption of any state law
claims related to opioid distribution and handling. Similarly, the
grievance and enforcement procedure in section twenty also points
in favor of preemption because courts may find that the player can
obtain the appropriate remedy through the enforcement process
without the need for litigation.
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2. Medical Marijuana Remains Unavailable
The 2020 CBA also includes changes to the league’s Substance
Abuse Policy. However, under the new policy marijuana remains
a banned substance.271 The league did make some concessions with
its marijuana policy, such as shrinking testing windows, raising the
threshold for a positive test, and eliminating suspensions. 272 However, the problem remains that marijuana is still a banned substance
and unavailable as an alternative to opioids and other painkillers. 273
By disallowing alternatives such as medical marijuana under
the Substance Abuse Policy, the league forces players to rely on
dangerous painkillers and opioids to manage their pain. The policy
states that the substance abuse “can lead to on-the-field injuries…and to personal hardship,”274 and also notes that substance
abuse has tragically led to the death of several NFL players.275
The Dent and Evans litigations illustrate that dangerous and powerful opioids and painkillers, which the policy effectively dictates that
players use, cause those exact harms. However, studies have shown
that marijuana can alleviate chronic pain, leading to less of a need
for dangerous opioids.276 Left without access to these alternatives,
players are forced to continue to take dangerous prescription painkillers that can mask injuries that can lead to further harm.
The league’s attitude toward marijuana is anachronistic. The
sole side-effect of marijuana mentioned in the 2020 CBA is schizophrenia, harkening back to the views portrayed in the 1936 film
Reefer Madness.277 The league justifies its ban of marijuana by
citing concern over player health while embracing the use of far
more dangerous opioids and painkillers.278 As long as the league
continues to list marijuana on its banned substances list, players
271
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will continue to face increased risk due to opioids and prescription
pain medication.
3. Insufficient Retirement Benefits
As the Dent and Evans lawsuits show, many former players
suffer from significant health problems due to painkiller use during
their careers.279 However, their pain does not end with their
careers.280 Players who meet the vesting requirement—three years
under the 2020 CBA—continue to receive health insurance for five
years after they retire.281 Those players who fail to qualify find
themselves without any health insurance after they hang up
their cleats.282 This leaves many players with significant pain from
injury exacerbated by opioids and painkillers, but no way to
receive treatment.283 Additionally, many of the players’ injuries
do not manifest until years later, leaving them without recourse
due to the statute of limitations even if they had met the vesting requirement.284 Unless they find a new job, secure insurance through
another employer, or purchase health insurance on their own, these
players are often left without coverage.
The players who are unable to work due to injuries may have no
other choice but to file disability or workers’ compensation claims.
In both cases, they often face opposition from the league and their
former clubs.285 The NFL’s disability board denies nearly sixty
percent of all claims.286 Even those players who successfully navigated the league’s arcane disability filing procedure will receive
reduced benefits due to the new social security offset provision in
the 2020 CBA.287 Whereas before players received NFL disability
payment plus their social security disability, now they receive
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NFL disability minus the amount of their social security benefits.288
This new provision reduces the resources available to former players
struggling with pain and puts a significant burden on the families
who were counting on those benefits. Additionally, players often
find themselves facing difficulty in obtaining workers’ compensation because they must battle their former employers who challenge
their claims—as of 2013, the league was fighting over 3,000
claims.289 Players also face statute of limitations and ever-changing
state laws, thanks to NFL lobbying efforts. 290
The NFL boasts that it has one of the most robust benefit plans
of any profession, but even still it does not adequately address the
needs of its former players. 291 There are approximately 18,000
former players who cannot afford their own health care.292 Many
of these players have injuries that are a result of opioid and
painkiller use during their careers.293 Without changes to the benefits offered to former players in the next CBA, that number will
continue to increase.
As shown in the Dent and Evans litigation, players face
significant challenges in obtaining relief for opioid related harms in
court.294 Statutes of limitation and preemption, particularly in light
of changes to the 2020 CBA, threaten the success of future litigation.295 Although the 2020 CBA includes alterations aimed at addressing the opioid issue, it still falls short and leaves the players
shouldering the burden of the opioid problem. It does not do enough
to address the conditions that make it difficult for players to avoid
harm in the first instance, or through means other than the courts.
First, team physicians, trainers, and management still face a conflict
of interest when it comes to player medical care. Similarly, health
insurance is limited to five years post-retirement and even then only
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for players who meet the vesting requirements. 296 Along the same
lines, filing an NFL disability claim remains complicated, but still
successful players will see their benefits cut due to the new social
security offset provision.297 Finally, former players who file workers’ compensation claims face challenges by their former teams
that delays, if not totally thwarts, their ability to obtain relief.298
The NFL and NFLPA must incorporate changes to future CBAs to
better care for and prevent opioid related harm to both active and
former players.
III. REMEDIES

To fully address the opioid and painkiller problem in the NFL,
the remedies must eliminate the “return to play” policy described in
Dent and Evans. They must also provide alternatives to these dangerous substances, as well as aid former players who are
already suffering from opioid use to obtain the needed treatment.
The NFL should adopt the following key remedies for current
players: creating an independent health care system and allowing players to have access to medical marijuana as alternatives to
opioids and Toradol. For retired players, increasing access to postretirement health care and disability benefits is of paramount
importance. Due to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining
relief through the courts, it is of vital importance that the NFLPA
negotiate to have such remedies included in the next CBA.
Procedural hurdles in court will remain, but addressing the above
issues in the CBA will reduce the need for judicial remedies by
preventing harm before it occurs and providing more benefits to aid
players after their careers are over.
A. Independent Medical Care
The “return to play” plan that was the focal point of the Dent and
Evans litigation shows that conflicts of interest are a significant
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problem in the NFL’s handling of opioids.299 Under the current
medical system in the NFL, team physicians are employed directly
by the team.300 Due to the pressure from their employers to quickly
return players to the field, even the most well-intentioned team
physician risks subconsciously putting the player’s health second to
their own job security. This culture exacerbates the over-prescription of opioids and painkillers by team doctors.
To prevent such results, the NFL and NFLPA should implement
a system of independent medical treatment for players. A Harvard
Medical School study, funded in part by the NFLPA, recommended
increasing the independence of team physicians.301 Under this system one set of doctors, the “Players’ Medical Staff,” would be responsible for providing player treatment.302 These doctors would be
selected and reviewed by a new “Medical Committee” comprised of
representatives from the NFL and NFLPA.303 The committee would
also set physician compensation, which teams would continue to be
responsible for paying.304 Rather than working for the club, however, the physicians’ sole responsibilities would be to the players. 305
Medical treatment would be provided without any communication
or input from the team,306 allowing doctors to only consider the best
interests of the players. Although they would be compensated by the
teams, these doctors would only be reviewed and potentially fired
by the joint Medical Committee, relieving them of the conflict of
interest.307 Part of this review would evaluate whether the doctor has
followed all legal and ethical requirements in distributing prescription pain medication.308 A second set of doctors, the “Club Evaluation Doctor[s],” would be responsible for evaluating players for
299
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business purposes,309 such as administering a pre-employment physical exam.310 They would advise teams as to the potential usefulness
of a player to the club311 and the wisdom of offering a contract or
not, which would be in-dependent of the Players’ Medical Staff’s
determinations.312 These doctors would not provide any treatment
whatsoever to players.313
The NFL has already acknowledged the efficacy of an independent approach to medical care in another context: concussions.314
As part of the NFL’s concussion protocol, three independent neurotrauma consultants monitor all games from the sideline looking
for players exhibiting signs of concussions. 315 This independent
specialist exists to avoid the pressures that a team-affiliated physician may have to put a player back on the field despite concussion
symptoms.316 The independent physician in the painkiller context
would achieve the same goal as an independent team physician
specialist in the concussion setting: removing any potential conflict
of interest.
Unfortunately, the NFL issued a response to the Harvard study
stating that they do not believe there is an “inherent conflict of
interest” in medical care.317 The NFL listed advances in medical
care over the years, ironically highlighting the independent neurologists in the concussion protocol as a key improvement while
simultaneously stating that there is no need for independent medical
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care overall.318 NFLPA executive director DeMaurice Smith’s
statements also indicate that he is hesitant to advocate for any measure that limits the clubs’ ability to hire their own team doctors.319
At a symposium at the University of Houston, Smith was asked
whether the NFLPA believes there is an inherent conflict of interest
in NFL medical care.320 He responded that the Hippocratic oath was
sufficient to address those concerns,321 despite the NFLPA’s own
2013 poll indicating that seventy-eight percent of players do not
trust team medical staffs.322 He also compared health care in the
NFL to that of a large university, saying “[w]e would never say we
need to come up with a committee of students and the university to
create a neutral health care system.”323
Negotiations for the next CBA will not begin until the end of the
decade.324 In the intervening years, the players must garner support
to implement an independent medical system in the next agreement.
Such a system is in the best interest of both the players and of the
league because, first, the risk of player health being put second to
profits is greatly reduced, ensuring that the players will receive
proper care and face fewer difficulties later in life. The league will
also benefit. Eliminating the conflict of interest will reduce potential
lawsuits about medical care as well as possibly lessen the volume of
players who will need disability or workers’ compensation due to
higher quality care.
B. Medical Marijuana as an Opioid Alternative
Another change that would benefit active players is permitting
the use of medical marijuana as an alternative to opioids and
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painkillers. Some current players, such as star wide receiver DeAndre Hopkins, believe that allowing these alternatives can only
help.325 Tennessee Titans linebacker Derrick Morgan signed a letter
in conjunction with Doctors for Cannabis Regulation 326 requesting
that the NFL consider changes to its marijuana policy.327 Another
recently retired player, Eugene Monroe, has written about and
discussed how marijuana helped his body recover from the physical
toll of his NFL career.328 Even prominent owner of the Dallas
Cowboys Jerry Jones has shown support for dropping the league’s
prohibition on marijuana.329
In addition, many former players tout the benefits of marijuana
for pain management.330 Franco Harris, Todd Herremanns, Ryan
O’Callaghan, and Randy Moss all support medical marijuana
use.331 Another retired player, Terrell Davis, said that medical
marijuana derivative products such as cannabidiol (“CBD”) have
allowed him to live normally without the need for opioids or
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painkillers.332 Former Hall of Famer Jack Ham even claims that
medical marijuana helped him overcome his opioid addiction. 333
Studies support Ham’s claim, finding that treatment consisting
of a combination of marijuana and opioids may allow for lower
doses of opioids to be administered, lessening side effects. 334
Harvard Medical School conducted a study in 2015 that examined
twenty-eight clinical trials of medical marijuana and found strong
evidence that its use aids in the treatment of chronic pain and other
ailments.335 Another review of similar studies found that “THC and
cannabinoids may [even] be superior to opioids in alleviating” some
pain.336 Despite the promise that these alternatives show, they are
banned under the NFL’s Substance Abuse Policy. 337
Other professional sports leagues do not take a similarly hard
stance against marijuana. The Canadian Football League (“CFL”)
does not test for marijuana at all.338 Along the same lines, the
National Hockey League (“NHL”) tests a portion of player samples
as part of its Substance Abuse and Behavioral program, but carries
no penalty for a positive test.339 Finally, Major League Baseball
(“MLB”) recently announced that it would no longer test players for
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marijuana, including minor leaguers who are not a party to the MLB
CBA.340 These leagues’ approaches to marijuana show that there is
no inherent reason to test for marijuana. Under a similar policy, NFL
players would be able to use medical marijuana as an alternative to
opioids without fear of league punishment. Given the high rate of
injury341 and the extent of the opioid problem in the NFL, the league
should adopt one of the above softer approaches.
If the NFL is hesitant to remove marijuana from its banned
substance list completely, another approach would be to expand
players’ ability to receive therapeutic use exemptions. Former
running back Mike James attempted to obtain such a TUE for medical marijuana.342 The league denied his request, stating that their
medical advisers did not agree with James’ doctor that marijuana
was essential for him and that his diagnosis of chronic pain was sufficient for a TUE.343 TUEs for medical marijuana are an uphill battle
for players because of the leagues’ skepticism about marijuana and
CBD.344 Players also face difficulty obtaining TUEs because of the
requirement that no other non-banned alternative treatment will be
available in order to qualify for one. Because opioids themselves are
a non-banned treatment available to players, they cannot get a
TUE for medical marijuana. The NFL should adjust its TUE policy
to permit players who want to avoid powerful opioid or NSAID
painkillers to use medical marijuana as an alternative.
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There have already been small steps forward, such as a willingness to explore alternatives as shown by a recent NFL and the
NFLPA forum to discuss CBD.345 The two sides are also committed
to conducting joint research into opioid alternatives, including
marijuana, under the new CBA.346 With so much scientific evidence
supporting the use of medical marijuana, and so many current and
former players showing support, the NFL must adjust its harsh
stance on the subject.
C. Increased Retirement Benefits
The NFL should remove the vesting requirement players must
reach to qualify for post-retirement health insurance and the fiveyear limit on the duration of those benefits. Lifetime health
insurance would help retired players address the harmful effects of
prior opioid use during their careers more fully. Many players have
passionately advocated for such changes to their post-career benefits.347 In a letter to Commissioner Roger Goodell, one group of hall
of famers promised to boycott future hall of fame induction
ceremonies until their demands for increased benefits are met.348
Chief among these demands is lifetime healthcare.349 Removing the
vesting requirement and five-year limit will allow a greater number
of players to keep their insurance and get treatment before problems
become debilitating and lead to further opioid use and dependence.
Since other leagues have adopted lifetime health insurance for
former players, this proposal is a feasible solution. MLB players
have the option to buy into their health insurance plan for life after
345
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retirement.350 The NHL, the league with the most comparable
injury rate to the NFL, offers players who have participated in at
least 160 games—about two seasons—to continue buying into their
health insurance for life post-retirement. 351 Similarly, the NBA’s
Retiree Medical Plan provides former players lifetime health
insurance free of charge.352 All of these plans greatly exceed the
plan offered by the NFL. While offering free health care to NFL
players would be costly, the players could buy into the plan just
as they do in the MLB to offset some of the cost. 353 Other revenue
streams could also be diverted to fund such a plan. Implementing
lifetime health insurance will take careful planning, but the retired
players will benefit greatly and the league would also gain an
advantage by avoiding future lawsuits from players who have no
other recourse for relief.
The league can similarly improve benefits in player pensions.
Pensions, like health insurance, are limited to players who meet the
vesting requirement.354 By contrast, NHL and MLB players are
eligible for pension plans as long as they played a single day in the
league.355 Increasing the number of players who are eligible for
pensions—a planned benefit for which the NFL can calculate
costs—may offset the expense of providing other unplanned
benefits such as disability benefits, of which the total is uncertain
because the NFL cannot determine now who will need disability
later.356 This could allow for the new social security disability offset
provision to be removed in the next CBA, returning players to the
amount of benefits they received under the 2011 CBA. Disability
benefits could also be streamlined to allow players to more easily
access a system that has been described by experts as arcane and
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difficult to navigate.357 With more players receiving pensions, there
will likely be less of a need both for disability benefits overall and
complex administrative processes to secure them.
Increasing retired players’ benefits will not be cheap, but a
league that takes in tens of billions of dollars per year can assess its
budget to procure the necessary funds. Since the players are the ones
who generate the revenue, they should share in the reward. The NFL
and the NFLPA have a decade to formulate a strategy to implement
greater retired player benefits in the next CBA. Given the sacrifice
the players made in service of the league’s success, their long-term
health should be among the top priorities during those negotiations.
CONCLUSION

The Dent and Evans lawsuits demonstrate the limitations of
finding relief in the NFL through the courts, and the shortcomings
of the new CBA to remedy the opioid problem. The NFL and
NFLPA must take action to address this issue in the next CBA.
Without the players, there is no NFL. Players devote their lives to
the league, training long hours during the season and offseason
so they can perform at an elite level each week for the fans and
their teams. The NFL’s current failure to address the opioid crisis
signals fans that they are indifferent to their players’ wellbeing
as long as profits are high. While the NFL remains popular and
its fanbase is extremely loyal, participation in youth football programs has been steadily declining due in part to parents’ concerns
over the health risks the game poses.358 Super Bowl and regular
season viewership have also declined in recent years, with some
speculating that concerns over the league’s handling of health and
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safety issues are partly to blame.359 Adopting the solutions proposed
here will protect players who have dedicated their lives to the game,
while simultaneously alleviating these fans’ concerns.
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